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Ladusaw, William. 1994. "Thetic and Categorical, Stage and Individual, Weak and Strong." In Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory Iv, edited by Mandy, Harvey and Santelmann, Lynn, 220-229. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
"Brentano saw his task as giving a classification of cognitive acts. He categorized such 'thoughts' into three main groups: presentations, judgments, and love. By this unexpected latter term, he meant affectual attitudes.
The notion of 'presentation' in his system is both fundamental and difficult to grasp. Its essence is the idea that a cognitive agent can have a presentation of an object without it being the presentation of any particular object. One can entertain presentations of objects which do not nor could not have any real existence, like unicorns, golden mountains, and I suppose round squares. Achieving a presentation of something is the first step toward the other two types of acts, of which judgments concern us most.
Judgments (and affectual attitudes or reactions) come in contrary pairs of affirmation and denial, the two modes of judgment. The basis for a judgment is a simple or compound presentation, so the root of the thetic/categorical distinction is in the definition of possible bases for judgments.
The basis for a thetic judgment is a presentation of an object: an entity or eventuality. An affirmation of such a presentation commits the judger to the existence of something which satisfies the presentation; a denial by contrast expresses a negative existence judgment.
The basis for a categorical judgment is compound: first a presentation which is clarified into a particular object satisfying the description, and then a property to be affirmed or denied of the object.
Despite the conceptualist foundation of this system, I think we can model it with some familiar objects. Let us equate the notion of a presentation of an object for a description of an object. A description is something which can be satisfied by an object. Take object to range over both individuals and eventualities, and we have two sorts of descriptions: descriptions of an individual and descriptions of an eventuality. Properties we can take as basic, but crucially not as descriptions of an individual or an eventuality. The modified ontology then is summarized in (12):
12. Modified Brentanan Ontology
objects: individuals, eventualities
descriptions of individuals and descriptions of eventualities
The assumptions about the forms of judgment can be summarized in (13):
13. Judgment structure
a. Basis for a thetic judgment: a description
b. Basis for a categorical judgment: an object and a property.
c. A thetic judgment is an affirmation or denial of the description in the basis. (Existential commitment)
d. A categorical judgment is an affirmation or denial of the basis property to the object in the basis. (Predication)
Note that (13c) and (13d) contain a theory of negation which recognizes both a relational and a unary notion of negative mode of judgment. The utility of this distinction has been argued for eloquently in precisely the same tradition by Laurence Horn The natural history of negation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989, which put me onto this line of thinking."
Land, J.P.N. 1876. "Brentano's Logical Innovations." Mind no. 1:289-292.
Libardi, Massimo. 1996. "Franz Brentano (1838-1917)." In The School of Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 25-79. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Macnamara, John. 1993. "Cognitive Psychology and the Rejection of Brentano." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour no. 23:117-137.
Marocco, Angelo. 1998. Brentano. Le Prove Dell'esistenza Di Dio. Roma: Studium.
Con una scelta di testi di Franz Brentano.
Marras, Ausonio. 1974. "The Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality." Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche no. 1:213-226.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 128-139
Martin, Wayne M. 2008. Theories of Judgment. Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2010. "Fichte's Logical Legacy: Thetic Judgment from the Wissenschaftslehre to Brentano." In Fichte and the Phenomenological Tradition, edited by Waibel, Violetta L., Breazeale, Daniel and Rockmore, Tom, 379-406. Berin: de Gruyter.
"It is not usual to think of Fichte as a logician, nor indeed to think of him as leaving a legacy that shaped the subsequent history of symbolic logic. But I argue here that there is such a legacy, and that Fichte formulated an agenda in formal logic that his students (and their students in turn) used to spark a logical revolution. That revolution arguably reached its culmination in the logical writings of Franz Brentano, better known as a founding figure of the phenomenological movement. In logical writings that were published only posthumously, but that were fully elaborated in the decade prior to the publication of Frege's Begriffschrift, Brentano (together with his collaborator Anton Marty) developed a radically innovative logical calculus that was explicitly designed to overthrow the orthodox logical analysis of judgment and inference. At the center of this revolution was the notion of thetic judgment [thetische Urteil], a form of judgment upon which Fichte had insisted in the first published version of the Wissenschaftslehre, and which his students subsequently set out to accommodate within the framework provided by Kant's general logic. But thetic
judgment proved resistant to such assimilation, and it was left to Brentano to use the analysis of thetic judgment in his attempt to topple a long-standing logical tradition.
In what follows I reconstruct the main episodes in this century-long drama in the logical theory of judgment. My discussion is divided into four sections. I begin with a review of Fichte's most explicit call for logical revolution, together with his introduction of the notion of thetic judgment, set against the backdrop of an anomaly within Kant's logical commitments. In the second section I trace the logical treatment of this anomaly among Fichte's philosophical progeny, in particular Johann Friedrich Herbart and Moritz Drobisch. The third section explores Brentano's position, and his more radical solution to the anomaly bequeathed by Kant. In the final section I return to Fichte, to consider to what degree these subsequent developments remained faithful to the logical agenda Fichte had projected."
Mayer-Hillebrand, Franziska. 1952. "Franz Brentanos Wissenschaftlicher Nachlass." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung no. 6:599-603.
———. 1963. "Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano: A Reply to Dr. Srzednicki." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 23:438-444.
———. 1966. "Franz Brentano Einfluss Auf Die Philosophie Seiner Zeit Und Der Gegenwart." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 20:373-394.
Mazzù, Antonino. 2004. "Psychologie Empirique Et Psychologie Métaphysique Chez F. Brentano." Annales de Phénomenologie no. 3:17-57.
———. 2007. "La Question Du Rapport Intentionnel Chez F. Brentano." In Questions Sur L'intentionnalité, edited by Couloubaritsis, Lambros and Mazzù, Antonino, 233-254. Bruxelles: Ousia.
McAlister, Linda Lopez. 1970. "Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence." Journal of History of Philosophy no. 8:423-430.
———. 1975. "Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality." Review of Metaphysics no. 28:328-338.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 151-159
———, ed. 1976. The Philosophy of Brentano. London: Duckworth.
Contents: Editor's Introduction VII-IX; Oskar Kraus: Biographical sketch of Franz Brentano 1; Carl Stumpf: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 10; Edmund Husserl: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 47; Étienne Gilson: Brentano's interpretation of medieval philosophy 56; Lucie Gilson: Franz Brentano on science and philosophy 68; E. B. Titchener: Brentano and Wundt: empirical and experimental psychology 80; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano's descriptive psychology 91; Thomas De Boer: The descriptive method of Franz Brentano: its two functions and their significance for phenomenology 101; Herbert Spiegelberg: Intention and intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl 108; Ausonio Marras: Scholastic roots of Brentano's conception of intentionality 128; Roderick Chisholm: Intentional inexistence 140; Linda McAlister: Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality 151; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano's theory of correct and incorrect emotion 160; George Edward Moore: Review of Franz Brentano's The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong 176; Gabriel Franks: Was G. E. Moore mistaken about Brentano? 182; Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Franz Brentano as Reist 194; D. B. Terrell: Brentano's argument for Reismus 204; Hugo Bergmann: Brentano's theory of induction 213; Oskar Kraus: Toward a phenomenognosy of time consciousness 224; Bibliography of the published writings of Brentano: 240; Bibliography of works on Brentano: 248; Index of names 255; General Index 259-262.
———. 1982. The Development of Franz Brentano's Ethics. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
McCormick, Peter. 1981. "Sur Le Développement Du Concept De L'intentionnalité Chez Brentano Et Husserl." Philosophiques no. 8:227-237.
Melandri, Enzo. 1987. "The ' Analogia Entis' According to Franz Brentano: A Speculative-Grammatical Analysis of Aristotle's ' Metaphysics'." Topoi no. 6:51-58.
Melle, Ullrich. 1988. "Zu Brentanos Und Husserls Ethikansatz: Die Analogie Zwischen Den Vernunftarten." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 1:109-120.
Mezei, Balasz. 2000. "Brentano and Husserl on the History of Philosophy." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 8:81-94.
"A particular subject-matter in Franz Brentano's philosophy is his approach to the history of philosophy. I shall consider the evolution of his concept of the history of philosophy, the sources of this concept, and, finally, its relationship to Edmund Husserl's understanding of the history of philosophy. Brentano's scheme of the four phases of the history of philosophy can serve as a principle of evaluation of what comes after Brentano's era in the history of philosophy."
Mezei, Balasz, and Smith, Barry. 1998. The Four Phases of Philosophy. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Modenato, Francesca. 1979. Coscienza Ed Essere in Franz Brentano. Bologna: Patron.
Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1972. The Concept of Intentionality. St. Louis: Warren H. Green.
Moore, George Edward. 1903. "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong." International Journal of Ethics no. 14:115-123.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), The philosophy of Brentano, pp. 176-181.
Moran, Dermot. 1996. "Brentano's Thesis." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes no. 70:1-27.
———. 2000. "Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts of Intentionality." Inquiry no. 43:39-65.
"Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano's conceptual framework and presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness (phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl's assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in Being and Time (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have endorsed his critique of Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. I argue that Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversing or abandoning his account. Heidegger's criticisms of representationalism merely repeat Husserl's. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl's account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice. In short, Heidegger is more dependent on Husserl than he ever publicly acknowledged."
———. 2000. "Franz Brentano: Descriptive Psychology and Intentionality." In Introduction to Phenomenology, 23-59. New York: Roultdge.
Morrison, James C. 1971. "Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 31:27-46.
Morscher, Edgar. 1978. "Brentano and His Place in Austrian Philosophy." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 5:1-10.
"The first part of this paper summarizes what I take to be the most important doctrines of Brentano's philosophy. The second part investigates the possible meanings of the term 'Austrian philosophy'. The third part attempts to say something about Brentano's place in Austrian philosophy -- whatever that may be --, while the fourth part focuses on a problem in which I am especially interested. The paper closes with a proposal for what the expression 'Austrian philosophy' could mean."
Mulligan, Kevin. 1988. "Judgings: Their Parts and Counterparts." Topoi Supplement no. 2:117-148.
———. 1997. "Sur L'histoire De L'approche Analytique De L'histoire De La Philosophie: De Bolzano Et Brentano À Bennett Et Barnes." In Philosophie Analytique Et Histoire De La Philosophie, edited by Vienne, Jean-Michel, 61-103. Paris: Vrin.
Mulligan, Kevin, and Smith, Barry. 1985. "Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 45:627-644.
Münch, Dieter. 1986. "Brentanos Lehre Von Der Intentionalen Inexistenz." In Von Bolzano Zu Wittgenstein. Zur Tradition Der Österreichischen Philosophie, edited by Nyiri, Janós, 119-127. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
———. 1989. "Brentano and Comte." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 36:33-54.
———. 1993. Intention Und Zeichen. Untersuchungen Zu Franz Brentano Und Zu Edmund Husserls Frühwerk. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp.
———. 1996. "Die Einheit Von Geist Und Leib: Brentanos Habilitationsschrift Über Die Psychologie Des Aristoteles Als Antwort Auf Zeller." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 6:125-144.
———. 2004. "Neues Zum Frühen Brentano." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 67:209-225.
———. 2004. "Franz Brentano Et La Réception Catholique D'aristote Au Xix Siècle." In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis, 231-248. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Orth, Ernst-Wolfgang. 1997. "Metaphysische Implikationen Der Intentionalität: Trendelenburg, Lotze, Brentano." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 7:15-30.
Parsons, Charles. 2004. "Brentano on Judgement and Truth." In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 168-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pasquerella, Lynn. 1987. "Intensional Logic and Brentano's Non-Propositional Theory of Judgement." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 29:117-119.
———. 1988. "Brentano and the Direct Attribution Theory." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 1:189-197.
"According to Brentano, what is characteristic of every mental act is the reference to something as an object. The exact nature of an object of our mental acts has, however, been first the subject of steady discussion in Brentano's writings and consecutively gave rise to controversy for contemporary philosophers of mind; e.g. Chisholm, Castañeda. What follows is an elucidation of the relationship between Brentano's final theory of sensation and its interpretation in Chisholm's Direct Attribution theory as a consideration of a recent challenge by Castañeda: that while the Brentanian-Chisholmian account is exemplary in dealing with tacit self-reference at the level of unreflective consciousness, this theory needs to be developed even further to be adequate to those cases of self-reference involved in reflective consciousness."
———. 1989. "Kotarbinski and Brentano on Truth." Topoi Supplement no. 4:98-106.
———. 1993. "Brentano and Aesthetic Intentions." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 4:235-249.
"Brentano's philosophy of art, contained primarily in his book, Grundzuge der Ästhetik, is the result of an original theory of intrinsic value that was derived from Brentano's philosophical psychology. In his aesthetics, Brentano endeavored to find an objective ground for the value of aesthetic contemplation through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. The lack of attention Brentano's aesthetics has received is surprising, given that two of the many students Brentano influenced, Husserl (through the development of the phenomenological movement) and Ehrenfels (through the development of Gestalt psychology) have had an extraordinary influence on twentieth century perceptions of art. In this paper I will attempt to redress some of this neglect by outlining Brentano's analysis of aesthetic intentions and the relationship his aesthetics bears to his overall philosophical system."
———. 2002. "Intentionality, Phenomenology and Sensation in Brentano." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 40 (Supplement):269-279.
Pavlik, Jan. 1991. "Brentano's Theory of Intentionality." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 3:63-70.
"Brentano's intentional psychology is an attempt at overcoming the Humean tradition characterized by probabilistic empirism, subjectivism and psychologism. Intentional psychology enables restoration of the autonomy of human psyche with reference to natural laws as well as overcoming the reduction of specific subject-object relations to object-object relations realized in associationist psychology. In contrast with speculative approaches of German classical philosophy, Brentano's theory enables empirical, non-metaphysical inquiry of subject-object relations."
Pietersma, Henry. 1978. "Brentano's Concept of the Evident." Analecta Husserliana no. 7:235-244.
Poli, Roberto. 1993. "Towards a Non-Symbolic Semantics." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 4:221-234.
"Starting from some ideas proposed by Suszko, Brentano's non-propositional theory of judgement is considered. In order to clarify (some of) the formal and ontological aspects of his theory, the distinction between external (symbolic) and internal (non-symbolic) semantics is introduced and discussed."
———. 1993. "Ontologia E Logica in Franz Brentano: Giudizi Categorici E Giudizi Tetici." Epistemologia no. 16:39-76.
"The various attempts to clarify and interpret Brentano's logical analysis have merely provided a paraphrase of Brentano own words. We will analyse Brentano's proposals against the background of traditional logic. In his Formale Logik, Bochenski explicitly warns us that logic not only "does not give proof of a linear continuity of evolution", but that the logic which follows a long period of decadence "departs, for the most part, from different presuppositions and points of view, uses a different technique, and develops previously neglected aspects of the problematic. It is a different form of logic". I shall bear these remarks of Bochenski's carefully in mind and I shall argue that mathematically-based modern formal logic and syllogistic theory of the past exemplify two distinct formal paradigms. My reference to two different paradigms, and not just to two different calculuses, implies that most of the syllogistic reformulations of this century are, broadly speaking, suspect; and specifically because they take the syllogistic to be a part or a fragment of first-order predicative calculus. Careful study of traditional logic immediately shows that traditional logic expresses specific ontological perspectives which are deeply embedded in its formal structures. From this point of view, Brentano's theory is a brilliant attempt to escape from some of the most difficult impasses of traditional logic and offers tools for new developments. Unfortunately, it arrived too late, just as the Fregean paradigm was about to burst on the scene."
———. 1993. "Kotarbinski, Ajdukiewicz, Brentano: The Dispute About Reism." In Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
———. 1993. "The Dispute over Reism: Kotarbinski - Ajdukiewicz - Brentano." In Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lwow-Warsaw School, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
———. 1994. "At the Origins of Analytic Philosophy." Aletheia no. 6:218-231.
———, ed. 1998. The Brentano Puzzle. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225.
"The papers collected in this volume arise from the conference "The Brentano Puzzle," organized in Bolzano / Bozen, Italy, on the 14th and 15th of November 1996 by the Central European Institute of Culture.
The conference's aim was to analyse the following puzzle. Even if the width and the depth of Brentano's intellectual legacy are now well known, those asked to list the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century very rarely mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of Brentano's 'invisibility.'
It is obvious that Brentano's invisibility has serious consequences on assessment of his philosophical theory. The reconstruction of Brentano's thought is still flawed and incomplete. Moreover, Brentano's emphasis on oral teaching, and the meagreness of his published work, compared with the enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence, are also of theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano's method of 'doing' philosophy. We know that the distinguishing feature of his philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial answers rather than on the construction of systems. Given these features, it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed for it.
This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed solutions which then reverberated through the entire edifice of his philosophy. This is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural sciences as its model. These factors also account for the different solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought, in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but not a univocity of solutions. It is this aspect that allows one to talk of a school of Brentano among his pupils, to detect a 'family resemblance' among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. Accordingly, his heterodox followers, such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, were more faithful to their master's thought than the orthodox Brentanians like Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand.
One further component of the Brentano puzzle is that a number of Brentano's outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools. Suffice it to mention Husserl's phenomenology, Twardowski's Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong's Graz school. The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano's school (in the broad sense) have come to obscure their common thematic origins. The sub–)`;Ýësequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology generated, as a side-effect, the oblivion into which Franz Brentano's thought then fell.
Nevertheless, Brentano and his school display surprising affinities with Frege and the tradition that he inspired. Perhaps the most interesting reconstruction of these connections is that accomplished by a number of works in German by Paul Linke. It was thought that a survey of Linke's thought might prove useful to English readers. For this reason the book also contains the English translation of his 'Gottlob Frege als Philosoph,' published in 1947, with an introduction by Claire Ortiz Hill.
Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of Brentano's and his followers' theses for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are also considered." (Foreword by Roberto Poli)
———. 2000. "Brentano in Italy." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 8:233-257.
———. 2004. "Approaching Brentano's Theory of Categories." In Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 285-322. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Potrc, Matjaz. 1993. "Grades of Intentionality." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 3:71-78.
"Intentional inexistence is to be understood via directedness to an internal object which may but needs not exist. As far as the relation to the object exists, it is infallible - contrary to the fallible directedness at an external object. Brentanian intentionality is based on the evidence, and does not allow for degrees. Brentano has been careful to delimit his project of "Psychognosie" from the physical and from the physiological. The thesis of intentional gradation is discussed, which allows for three degrees. The first form of intentionality involves simple tropisms. The second grade of intentionality is the one of generality, as opposed to specificity and particularity. The third intentional grade would enable directedness to the singular.
As human organisms only are able to entertain directedness to the singular, brentanian intentionality would fall under the second kind of directedness, the one involving generality. Supposition that this thesis is right might then lead to the question whether Brentano really described intentionality specific for human organisms."
Prechtl, Peter. 1989. "Die Struktur Der Intentionalität Bei Brentano Und Husserl." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 2:117-130.
Rancurello, Antos. 1968. A Study of Franz Brentano. His Psychological Standpoint and His Significance in the History of Psychology. New York: Academic Press.
Richardson, Robert. 1983. "Brentano on Intentional Inexistence and the Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 65:250-282.
Rojszczack, Artur. 1994. "Wharheit Und Urteilsevidenz Bei Franz Brentano." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 5:187-218.
———. 2005. From the Act of Judging to the Sentence. The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski. Dordrecht: Springer.
Edited by Jan Wolenski
Rollinger, Robin D. 1993. "Husserl and Brentano on Imagination." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 75:195-210.
Reprinted with the title: Brentano and Husserl on Imagination in: R. D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 29-50.
———. 1999. Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2004. "Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl." In Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 233-262.
———. 2005. "Meinong and Brentano." Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien no. 1:159-198.
"Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe, began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though Meinong's philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called "assumptions". Thus he opposed Brentano's classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called "descriptive phenomenology"), which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science."
———. 2006. "Brentano's Logic and Marty's Early Philosophy of Language." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 12:77-98.
———. 2009. "Brentano's Psychology and Logic and the Basis of Twardowski's Theory of Presentations." The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication:1-23.
Rossi, Guido. 1926. Giudizio E Raziocinio. Studi Sulla Logica Dei Brentaniani. Milano: Sodalitas.
Rothenberg, Beno. 1962. Studien Zur Logik Franz Brentano's.
Inaugural Dissertation. University Frankfurt am Main.
Runggaldier, Edmund. 1989. "On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of 'Intentionality' in Brentano." Topoi no. 8:97-103.
"The early Brentano identifies intentionality with "intentional inexistence", i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of Being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano."
Russo, Antonio. 2003. "Franz Brentano E Heinrich Denifle: Un Carteggio Inedito." Studium:333-356.
———. 2003. La Scuola Cattolica Di Franz Brentano: Heinrich Suso Denifle. Trieste: EUT.
Con un carteggio inedito F. Brentano - H. Denifle.
Sanford, David. 1997. "Chisholm on Brentano's Thesis." In The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, edited by Hahn, Lewis. Chicago: Open-Court Publishing Co.
Sauer, Werner. 2000. "Erneuerung Der Philosophia Perennis: Über Die Ersten Vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 58/59:119-150.
———. 2006. "Die Einheit Der Intentionalitätskonzeption Bei Brentano." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 73:1-26.
"The objective of this paper is to refute the widely held view that in the wake of his so-called reistic turn Brentano subjected his notion of intentionality to a deep-going revision, viz., that he turned from an ontological account of the intentional object by way of identifying it with the thought-of-thing, i.e., the intentional correlate, or by way of attributing to it a peculiar sort of existence, to a non-ontological account thereof. It will be shown that neither the pre-reistic Brentano espoused anything of an ontological account of the intentional object in that he both distinguished it sharply from the intentional correlate and definitely rejected the idea of there being different sorts of existence, and it will be argued that the apparently ineradicable inclination to ascribe to the pre-reistic Brentano an ontological account of the intentional object stems from ignoring the Aristotelian background of Brentano's thinking about relations."
Schaar, Maria van der. 1999. "Evidence and the Law of Excluded Middle: Brentano on Truth." In The Logica Yearbook 1998, 110-120. Prague: Filosofia.
———. 2003. "Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 10:119-150.
"In this paper it will be argued that Brentano's later writings about this topic can be understood better if one describes it as a result partly of his immanent development and partly of Brentano's reactions to his contemporaries."
Schmit, Roger. 1985. "Allgemeinheit Und Existenz. Zur Analyse Der Kategorischen Urteils Bei Herbart, Sigwart, Brentano Und Frege." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 23:58-78.
Schuhmann, Karl. 1988. "Die Einwirkung Brentanos Auf Die Mûnchener Phänomenologen." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 1:97-107.
———. 1994. "Der Gegenstandsbegriff in Brentanos 'Psychognosie'." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 5:167-176.
Sebestik, Jan. 1984. "Bolzano Et Brentano. Deux Sources Autrichiennes Du Cercle De Vienne." Fundamenta Scientiae no. 5:219-235.
Simons, Peter M. 1984. "A Brentanian Basis for Leśniewskian Logic." Logiquet et Analyse no. 27:297-307.
Reprinted in: Peter Simons - Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 259-269.
———. 1986. "Brentano's Reform of Logic." Topoi no. 6:25-38.
Reprinted in: Peter Simons - Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 41-69
———. 1988. "Brentano's Theory of Categories: A Critical Reappraisal." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 1:47-61.
"In his doctoral dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles Brentano tried to show that (against criticism of this) one could indeed give a principle defense of Aristotle's table of categories as a coherent system. In later texts Brentano appears sharply critical of Aristotle, mainly in respect to Aristotle's mereology, or theory of part and whole, and to his theory of substance and accident.
It is argued that Brentano hadn't observed that Aristotle's belief that there are as many predicative senses of 'be' as there are categories of being is based not on his mereology but on his theory of definition. Overlooking this Brentano was led to far reaching inadequate ontological consequences."
———. 1999. "Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists." In German Philosophy since Kant, edited by O'Hear, Anthony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Although Brentano generally regarded himself as at heart a metaphysician, his work then and subsequently has always been dominated by the Psychology. He is rightly celebrated as the person who reintroduced the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of intentio back into the study of the mind. Brentano's inspiration was Aristotle's theory of perception in De anima, though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval. For the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my Introduction to the reprinted English translation. Alongside Aristotle the work shows influences of Descartes, Comte and the British empiricists. The theory of intentionality presented in the Psychology is much less modern and less plausible than almost all recent commentary would have it, and was in any case not where Brentano's main interest lay. Intentionality simply served to demarcate mental phenomena from physical, in Book One, but the main aim was a classification of the mental, outlined in Book Two. Books Three to Five were to have dealt in detail with the three main classes of presentations, judgements and feelings, with the final book considering the metaphysics: mind-body and the immortality of the soul. Brentano's shifting views, recently documented in English with Benito Muller's translation of Descriptive Psychology, a work from the transitional 1890s, made the original plan obsolete. The role of an a priori, philosophical or descriptive psychology, methodologically prior to empirical-experimental genetic psychology, foreshadowed and influenced Husserl's notion of phenomenology, and Brentano's Comtean methodological epoche of desisting from controversial metaphysical statements in favour of an examination of the phenomena likewise presaged Husserl's more ponderous phenomenological reductions.
Brentano's other work covers most areas of philosophy, notably ethics, where he upheld a form of a priori intuitionism much admired by G. E. Moore, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of language, deductive and inductive logic, and the history of philosophy. I shall mention just two areas. In his logic lectures from 1866 onwards (a compilation published 1956) Brentano rejected the subject-predicate analysis of simple judgements and proposed instead (for which he apparently secured written assent from Mill) that all judgements are logical compounds of positive and negative existential judgements. For example the universal judgement All men are mortal becomes the negative existential There are no immortal men. On this basis Brentano radically simplified the inference rules of deductive logic. While unlike de Morgan, Frege and others he does not go beyond logic's traditional scope by recognising relations, within its bounds his reformed-term logic is simple, elegant and easily teachable. Some of his ideas in logic influenced the young Husserl. Unfortunately Brentano took against mathematical logic, which he wrongly associated exclusively with Hamilton's confused doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. His inductive logic, which takes up by far the greater part of his logic lectures, remains unresearched to this day." (pp. 118-119)
———. 2000. "The Four Phases of Philosophy: Brentano's Theory and Austria's History." Monist no. 83:68-88.
———. 2004. "Judging Correctly: Brentano and the Reform of Elementary Logic." In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 45-65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Simons, Peter M., and Wolenski, Jan. 1989. "De Veritate: Austro-Polish Contributions to the Theory of Truth from Brentano to Tarski." In The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School, edited by Szaniawski, Klemens, 391-442. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Smith, Barry. 1981. "Kafka and Brentano: A Study in Descriptive Psychology." In Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and Literature in Austria-Hungary and Her Successor States, edited by Smith, Barry, 113-160. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
———. 1987. "The Substance of Brentano's Ontology." Topoi no. 6:39-49.
———. 1988. "The Soul and Its Parts. A Study in Aristotle and Brentano." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 1:75-88.
"The attempt is made to show that the key for a correct interpretation of Brentano's writings can be derived from an examination of his very early dissertations. The overarching context of all Brentano's writings is the psychology of Aristotle and the ontology of material and immaterial substance that goes together therewith. The present remarks will accordingly consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically of Aristotle's conception of the soul, as reflected by Brentano in his Psychology of Aristotle, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Descriptive Psychology."
———. 1989. "The Primacy of Place: An Investigation in Brentanian Ontology." Topoi no. 8:43-51.
———. 1990. "On the Phases of Reism." In Kotarbinski: Logic, Semantics and Ontology, edited by Wolenski, Jan, 137-184. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1993. "The Soul and Its Parts Ii: Varieties of Inexistence." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 4:35-52.
"A Brentanian might criticize contemporary philosophy of mind on at least the following counts:
i. its taxonomy of types of mental act and state is too narrow (thus its repertoire consists, on many standard accounts, in little more than 'beliefs' and `desires');
ii. its treatment of mental acts and states is too slavishly oriented around linguistic factors (thus for example it is standardly suggested that the philosophy of mind is most properly concerned with the so-called 'propositional attitudes');
iii. its treatment of the temporal structures of mental acts and states is overly crude (thus in many standard accounts punctual and episodic acts are not distinguished from enduring states and dispositions);
iv. it presupposes an over-crude theory of the internal structures of mental acts and states and of the corresponding types of parts and unity.
It is with this last that we shall be principally concerned in what follows, and more precisely with Brentano's own account of the part-whole structures obtaining in the mental sphere."
———. 1994. Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano. Chicago: Open Court.
———. 2000. "Boundaries: A Brentanian Theory." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 8:107-114.
"According to Brentano's theory of boundaries, no boundary can exist without being connected with a continuum. But there is no specifiable part of the continuum, and no point, which is such that we may say that it is the existence of that part or of that point which conditions the boundary. - An adequate theory of the continuum must now recognize that boundaries be boundaries only in certain directions and not in others. This leads to consequences in other areas, too."
Sorabji, Richard. 1991. "From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. Supplementary volume:227-259.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1936. "Der Begriff Der Intentionalität in Der Scholastik Bei Brentano Und Bei Husserl." Philosophische Hefte no. 5:75-91.
Revised by the author and translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.) - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 108-127
———. 1960. The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Second revised edition 1978; Third expanded edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann 1982.
Chapter I. Franz Brentano (1838-1917) forerunner of the phenomenological movement - pp. 27-50.
"Brentano's first concern in psychology was to find a characteristic which separates psychological from non-psychological or 'physical' phenomena. It was in connection with this attempt that he first developed his celebrated doctrine of intentionality as the decisive constituent of psychological phenomena. The sentence in which he introduces the term 'intentionality' is of such crucial importance that I shall render it here in literal translation: Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference (Beziehung) to a content, the directedness (Richtung) toward an object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object quality (immanente Gegenständlichkeit). Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner. In the representation (Vorstellung) something is represented, in the judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention (intentional). (1)Actually, this first characterization of the psychological phenomenon makes use of two phrases: 'intentional inexistence' and 'reference to a content.' It is the first of these phrases which has attracted most attention, and it has even given rise to the view, supported by both anti-scholastics and neo-scholastic critics, that this whole doctrine was nothing but a loan from medieval philosophy. While a quick reading of the passage may seem to confirm this view, it is nevertheless misleading. 'Intentional inexistence,' which literally implies the existence of an 'intentio' inside the intending being, as if imbedded in it, is indeed a Thomistic conception. But it is precisely this conception which Brentano himself did not share, or which in any case he abandoned, to the extent of finally even dropping the very term 'intentionality.' Thus, the second characterization of the psychic phenomenon, 'reference to an object,' is the more important and the only permanent one for Brentano; it is also the one listed exclusively in the Table of Contents, beginning with the first edition. What is more: as far as I can make out, this characterization is completely original with Brentano, except for whatever credit he himself generously extends to Aristotle for its 'first germs' in a rather minor passage of the Metaphysics (1021 a 29). It was certainly none of Brentano's doing that this new wholly unscholastic conception came to sail under the old flag of 'intentionality.' Reference to an object is thus the decisive and indispensable feature of anything that we consider psychical: No hearing without something heard, no believing without something believed, no hoping without something hoped, no striving without something striven for, no joy without something we feel joyous about, etc. Physical phenomena are characterized, by contrast, as lacking such references. It also becomes clear at this point that Brentano's psychological phenomena are always acts, taking this term in a very broad sense which comprises experiences of undergoing as well as of doing, states of consciousness as well as merely transitory processes. Here, then, Brentano for the first time uncovered a structure which was to become one of the basic patterns for all phenomenological analysis." pp. 36-37
(1) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I, Buch II, Kapitel I § 5 (pp. 125 f.; English translation p. 88).
———. 1978. "On the Significance of the Correspondence between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 5:95-116.
"This correspondence, still unpublished, extends over fourty years. Its significance is both biographical and philosophical. Biographically it shows Brentano's tolerant friendship for his emancipated student and Husserl's unwavering veneration for his only philosophical teacher. The philosophical issues taken up are Euclidean axiomatics, Husserl's departure from Brentano in the Logical Investigations by distinguishing two types of logic as the way out from psychologism, and the possibility of negative presentations, but not Husserl's new phenomenology. Few agreements are reached, but the dissents were clarified."
Spinicci, Paolo. 1985. "Realtà E Rappresentazione. Saggio Sulla Genesi Della Filosofia Dell'esperienza Nel Pensiero Di Franz Brentano." Rivista di Storia della Filosofia:229-254.
Srzednicki, Jan. 1962. "Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 22:308-316.
———. 1963. "A Reply to Professor F. Mayer-Hillebrand." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 23:445-446.
———. 1965. Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 1966. "Some Elements of Brentano's Analysis of Language and Their Ramifications." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 20:434-445.
Tanasescu, Ion. 2003. "Das Seiende Als Wahres Und Das Sein Der Kopula in Der Dissertation Brentanos." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschungno. 10:175-192.
Tassone, Biagio G. 2012. From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano's 'Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint' and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tegtmeier, Erwin. 1989. "Individuation, Identity and Sameness. A Comparison of Aristotle and Brentano." Topoi Supplement no. 4:117-126.
Terrell, Dailey Burnham. 1966. "Brentano's Argument for Reismus." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 20:446-459.
Reprinted with revisions, in: Linda McAlister - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 204-212
———. 1976. "Franz Brentano's Logical Innovations." Midwest Studies in Philosophy no. 1:81-91.
———. 1978. "Quantification and Brentano's Logic." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 5:45-66.
"Brentano's innovations in logical theory are considered in the context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between Urteil and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the Urteil as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of substitutional quantification, rendering the substitutional interpretation immune to problems that often arise as to the relation between substitutional range and referential range."
———. 1983. "Brentano's Philosophy of Mind." In Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey - Vol. 4: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Fløistad, Guttorm. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Textor, Mark. 2006. "Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness." Dialectica:411-432.
"Brentano's theory of inner consciousness has recently had a surprising comeback. However, it is still an open question how it is best understood. It is widely held that according to Brentano a mental act is conscious iff it is self-presenting. In contrast, I will argue that Brentano holds that a mental act x is conscious iff it is unified with an immediately evident cognition ('Erkenntnis') of x. If one understands Brentano's theory in this way, it promises to shed light on standard problems for theories of inner consciousness."
Thomasson, Amie. 2000. "After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness." European Journal of Philosophy no. 8:190-209.
Tomasi, Pietro. 2007. "The Unpublished "History of Philosophy" (1866-1867) by Franz Brentano." Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems no. 17:99-108.
"There are many difficulties with the existing interpretation of Brentano's works. The problem stems from the fact that Brentano's works, letters, manuscripts, memoirs, etc. remain unpublished or undiscovered. Moreover some Brentano's scholars, namely Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrandt, were incorrect in their method in publishing the philosopher's works. Namely, they misinterpreted his earlier works by incorporating numerous interpolations from different time periods as being the philosopher's final thoughts. More importantly, as evidenced by Antonio Russo's recent discovery (*), they also failed to realise the fact that Brentano's own theoretical views or works were mostly based on Aristotle and Thomas thoughts on metaphysics, that Brentano's main intention was to develop a scientific demonstration on this topic, and that this issue occupied his mind until his death.
It is hoped that this paper goes some way in resolving the said errors and coupled with the continue discovery of new material that the jigsaw of Brentano's works and thinking shall someday be correctly completed."
(*) [See: Russo Antonio (2003)]
———. 2009. Una Nuova Lettura Dell'aristotele Di Franz Brentano Alla Luce Di Alcuni Inediti. Trento: Uni Service.
Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1999. "Franz Brentano and the History of Philosophy." In On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy, edited by Brandl, Johannes and Wolenski, Jan, 243-253. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Translation by Arthur Szylewicz of a review of F. Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand (1895) published in: Przelom, 11 (II) August 3 1895, Vienna, pp. 335-346.
Valentine, Elizabeth. 2003. "The Relation of Brentano to British Philosophy." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 10:263-268.
"Brentano's work has had, and has, its greatest influence in Austria, Germany, Poland and Italy, but its importance for an understanding of British analytical philosophy is increasingly being recognised."
Vallicella, William. 2001. "Brentano on Existence." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 18:311-327.
Vasyukov, Vladimir L. 1993. "Antidiodorean Logics and the Brentano-Husserl's Conception of Time." Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems no. 4:373-388.
Velarde-Mayol, Victor. 2002. On Brentano. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Vinogradov, Evgeni G. 1998. "The Rationalistic Paradigm of Franz Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski." In The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski, Jan, 101-104. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Volpi, Franco. 1976. Heidegger E Brentano. L'aristotelismo E Il Problema Dell'univocità Dell'essere Nella Formazione Filosofica Del Giovane Martin Heidegger. Padova: Cedam.
———. 1989. "The Experience of Temporal Objects and the Constitution of Time-Consciousness by Brentano." Topoi Supplement no. 4:127-140.
———. 1989. "War Franz Brentano Ein Aristoteliker? Zu Brentanos Und Aristoteles' Auffassung Der Psychologie Als Wissenschaft." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 2:13-29.
———. 2004. "La Doctrine Aristotélicienne De L'être Chez Brentano Et Son Influence Sur Heidegger." In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis, 277-293. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
———. 2004. "La Doctrine Aristotélicienne De L'être Chez Brentano Et Son Influence Sur Heidegger." In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis, 277-293. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Weingartner, Paul. 1978. "Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Principle ' Ens Et Verum Convertuntur'." Grazer Philosophische Studienno. 5:183-196.
"This paper investigates Brentano's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth within the context of a discussion of his ontological assumptions. Brentano's interpretation of the formula veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus and of the principle ens et verum convertuntur is shown to fit into the history of these principles and into modern interpretations like that of Tarski."
Werle, Josef. 1982. "Zur Edition Der Vorlseungen Franz Brentanos Über Geschichte Der Philosophie." Phänomenologische Forschungen no. 12:178-187.
———. 1989. Franz Brentano Und Die Zukunft Der Philosophie. Studien Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte Und Wissenschaftssystematik Im 19. Jahrhundert. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Werner, Alfons. 1930. Die Psychologisch-Erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen Der Metaphysik Franz Brentanos. Hildesheim: Borgmeyer.
Wolenski, Jan. 1989. "Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski's Semantic Theory." Topoi no. 8:105-110.
"This paper is a sequel to Simons and Wolenski [De Veritate: Austro-Polish contributions to the theory of truth from Brentano to Tarski, 1989], which contains a short discussion of Brentano's arguments against the theory of truth based on the concept of a correspondence between truth-bearers and reality (or its appropriate portions). In that paper we attempt to show that Tarski's conception successfully meets Brentano's objections. l Here I should like to extend as well as, in some points, improve what we said in Simons and Wolenski . There are several reasons for doing this. First, the renaissance of Brentano's own philosophy and Brentanism in general requires that his arguments deserve considerable attention. Secondly, Brentano's arguments against the correspondence theory of truth have become part of philosophical folklore.
Thirdly, Tarski's semantic truth-definition, despite the reservations raised by several authors, is often considered as a possible modern interpretation of the classical theory of truth. Fourth, Tarski's theory of truth is deeply rooted in the Brentanian theoretical tradition, independent of Tarski's own philosophical consciousness.
It is further interesting to see how, if at all, his definition of truth is affected by critical arguments of his philosophical great-grandfather (via Twardowski, Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski and Kotarbinski)." (notes omitted)
———. 1994. "Brentano, the Univocality of Thinking, 'Something', and 'Reism'." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 5:149-166.
"Brentano's argument for Reism from the univocality of 'thinking' is examined. Firstly, Brentano's original formulation is given. Secondly, comments on the argument made by Marty, Kamitz, Teller and Farias are summarized and briefly discussed. The univocality argument is then embedded into the frameworks of two logical systems: predicate calculus and Leśniewskian ontology; the latter system is shown as a more effective basis for reism than the former. Finally, it is argued that a distinction between formal-ontological reism and metaphysical reism should be made."
———. 1996. "Reism in the Brentanist Tradition." In The School of Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 357-375. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Wüstenburg, Klaus. 2004. Die Konsequenz Des Phänomenalismus. Erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchungen in Kritischer Auseinandersetzung Mit Hume, Brentano Und Husserl. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
Zahavi, Dan. 2004. "Back to Brentano?"Journal of Consciousness Studies no. 11:66-87.
"For a couple of decades, higher-order theories of consciousness have enjoyed great popularity, but they have recently been met with growing dissatisfaction. Many have started to look elsewhere for viable alternatives, and within the last few years, quite a few have rediscovered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of consciousness will be outlined and discussed. It will be argued that it can contribute important insights to our understanding of the relation between consciousness and self- awareness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some problems, and that it will ultimately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the lookout for promising alternatives to the higher-order theories, than to return all the way to Brentano."
Zelaniec, Wojciech. 1996. "Franz Brentano and the Principle of Individuation." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 6:145-164.
"In this article I discuss a view on individuation exposed by Brentano in his Theory of Categories. According to this view, it is the spatial location of a physical thing that is its principle of individuation. I put forward hypotheses concerning the assumptions on the force of which Brentano might have arrived at this view. I also assess the `price' that has to be paid for making such assumptions."
———. 1997. "Disentanling Brentano: Why Did He Get Individuation Wrong?"Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 7:455-463.
Zimmer, Alf. 1993. "On Agents and Objects: Some Remarks on Brentanian Perception." In Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth, edited by Poli, Roberto, 93-112. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Zingari, Guido. 1989. "Brentano Und Leibniz: Erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 2:31-42.
On the website "Theory and History of Ontology" (www.ontology.co)
Pages on the Philosophy of Franz Brentano:
Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries (a selection of critical judgments about some of the greatest philosophers of the recent past)